Neo-conservatism
illuminex
Join Date: 2004-03-13 Member: 27317Members, Constellation
Join Date: 2004-03-13 Member: 27317Members, Constellation
in Discussions
<div class="IPBDescription">As written by a God Father</div> <a href='http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/000tzmlw.asp' target='_blank'>Here's the link.</a>
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->WHAT EXACTLY IS NEOCONSERVATISM? Journalists, and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is "neoconservative," and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name. Those of us who are designated as "neocons" are amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: Is there any "there" there?
Even I, frequently referred to as the "godfather" of all those neocons, have had my moments of wonderment. A few years ago I said (and, alas, wrote) that neoconservatism had had its own distinctive qualities in its early years, but by now had been absorbed into the mainstream of American conservatism. I was wrong, and the reason I was wrong is that, ever since its origin among disillusioned liberal intellectuals in the 1970s, what we call neoconservatism has been one of those intellectual undercurrents that surface only intermittently. It is not a "movement," as the conspiratorial critics would have it. Neoconservatism is what the late historian of Jacksonian America, Marvin Meyers, called a "persuasion," one that manifests itself over time, but erratically, and one whose meaning we clearly glimpse only in retrospect.
Viewed in this way, one can say that the historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against
their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy. That this new conservative politics is distinctly American is beyond doubt. There is nothing like neoconservatism in Europe, and most European conservatives are highly skeptical of its legitimacy. The fact that conservatism in the United States is so much healthier than in Europe, so much more politically effective, surely has something to do with the existence of neoconservatism. But Europeans, who think it absurd to look to the United States for lessons in political innovation, resolutely refuse to consider this possibility.
Neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the "American grain." It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic. Its 20th-century heroes tend to be TR, FDR, and Ronald Reagan. Such Republican and conservative worthies as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Dwight Eisenhower, and Barry Goldwater are politely overlooked. Of course, those worthies are in no way overlooked by a large, probably the largest, segment of the Republican party, with the result that most Republican politicians know nothing and could not care less about neoconservatism. Nevertheless, they cannot be blind to the fact that neoconservative policies, reaching out beyond the traditional political and financial base, have helped make the very idea of political conservatism more acceptable to a majority of American voters. Nor has it passed official notice that it is the neoconservative public policies, not the traditional Republican ones, that result in popular Republican presidencies.
One of these policies, most visible and controversial, is cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady economic growth. This policy was not invented by neocons, and it was not the particularities of tax cuts that interested them, but rather the steady focus on economic growth. Neocons are familiar with intellectual history and aware that it is only in the last two centuries that democracy has become a respectable option among political thinkers. In earlier times, democracy meant an inherently turbulent political regime, with the "have-nots" and the "haves" engaged in a perpetual and utterly destructive class struggle. It was only the prospect of economic growth in which everyone prospered, if not equally or simultaneously, that gave modern democracies their legitimacy and durability.
The cost of this emphasis on economic growth has been an attitude toward public finance that is far less risk averse than is the case among more traditional conservatives. Neocons would prefer not to have large budget deficits, but it is in the nature of democracy--because it seems to be in the nature of human nature--that political demagogy will frequently result in economic recklessness, so that one sometimes must shoulder budgetary deficits as the cost (temporary, one hopes) of pursuing economic growth. It is a basic assumption of neoconservatism that, as a consequence of the spread of affluence among all classes, a property-owning and tax-paying population will, in time, become less vulnerable to egalitarian illusions and demagogic appeals and more sensible about the fundamentals of economic reckoning.
This leads to the
issue of the role of the state. Neocons do not like the concentration of services in the welfare state and are happy to study alternative ways of delivering these services. But they are impatient with the Hayekian notion that we are on "the road to serfdom." Neocons do not feel that kind of alarm or anxiety about the growth of the state in the past century, seeing it as natural, indeed inevitable. Because they tend to be more interested in history than economics or sociology, they know that the 19th-century idea, so neatly propounded by Herbert Spencer in his "The Man Versus the State," was a historical eccentricity. People have always preferred strong government to weak government, although they certainly have no liking for anything that smacks of overly intrusive government. Neocons feel at home in today's America to a degree that more traditional conservatives do not. Though they find much to be critical about, they tend to seek intellectual guidance in the democratic wisdom of Tocqueville, rather than in the Tory nostalgia of, say, Russell Kirk.
But it is only to a degree that neocons are comfortable in modern America. The steady decline in our democratic culture, sinking to new levels of vulgarity, does unite neocons with traditional conservatives--though not with those libertarian conservatives who are conservative in economics but unmindful of the culture. The upshot is a quite unexpected alliance between neocons, who include a fair proportion of secular intellectuals, and religious traditionalists. They are united on issues concerning the quality of education, the relations of church and state, the regulation of pornography, and the like, all of which they regard as proper candidates for the government's attention. And since the Republican party now has a substantial base among the religious, this gives neocons a certain influence and even power. Because religious conservatism is so feeble in Europe, the neoconservative potential there is correspondingly weak.
AND THEN, of course, there is foreign policy, the area of American politics where neoconservatism has recently been the focus of media attention. This is surprising since there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience. (The favorite neoconservative text on foreign affairs, thanks to professors Leo Strauss of Chicago and Donald Kagan of Yale, is Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War.) These attitudes can be summarized in the following "theses" (as a Marxist would say): First, patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment. Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny. International institutions that point to an ultimate world government should be regarded with the deepest suspicion. Third, statesmen should, above all, have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies. This is not as easy as it sounds, as the history of the Cold War revealed. The number of intelligent men who could not count the Soviet Union as an enemy, even though this was its own self-definition, was absolutely astonishing.
Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal. That is why it was in our national interest to come to the defense of France and Britain in World War II. That is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.
Behind all this is a fact: the incredible military superiority of the United States vis-à-vis the nations of the rest of the world, in any imaginable combination. This superiority was planned by no one, and even today there are many Americans who are in denial. To a large extent, it all happened as a result of our bad luck. During the 50 years after World War II, while Europe was at peace and the Soviet Union largely relied on surrogates to do its fighting, the United States was involved in a whole series of wars: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War. The result was that our military spending expanded more or less in line with our economic growth, while Europe's democracies cut back their military spending in favor of social welfare programs. The Soviet Union spent profusely but wastefully, so that its military collapsed along with its economy.
Suddenly, after two decades during which "imperial decline" and "imperial overstretch" were the academic and journalistic watchwords, the United States emerged as uniquely powerful. The "magic" of compound interest over half a century had its effect on our military budget, as did the cumulative scientific and technological research of our armed forces. With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.
The older, traditional elements in the Republican party have difficulty coming to terms with this new reality in foreign affairs, just as they cannot reconcile economic conservatism with social and cultural conservatism. But by one of those accidents historians ponder, our current president and his administration turn out to be quite at home in this new political environment, although it is clear they did not anticipate this role any more than their party as a whole did. As a result, neoconservatism began enjoying a second life, at a time when its obituaries were still being published.
Irving Kristol is author of "Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea." <!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
With all of the posting about "OMG NEO-CONS ARE KILLING ALL11!!!11!11," I thought it helpful to help clarify the basic tenets of neo-con thought.
Keep in mind, I don't agree with them 100 % (I lean quite a bit more Libertarian than Republican), but I'm posting this here so people quit using Neo-Con as some buzzword for "war monger" or "danger to international peace."
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->WHAT EXACTLY IS NEOCONSERVATISM? Journalists, and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is "neoconservative," and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name. Those of us who are designated as "neocons" are amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: Is there any "there" there?
Even I, frequently referred to as the "godfather" of all those neocons, have had my moments of wonderment. A few years ago I said (and, alas, wrote) that neoconservatism had had its own distinctive qualities in its early years, but by now had been absorbed into the mainstream of American conservatism. I was wrong, and the reason I was wrong is that, ever since its origin among disillusioned liberal intellectuals in the 1970s, what we call neoconservatism has been one of those intellectual undercurrents that surface only intermittently. It is not a "movement," as the conspiratorial critics would have it. Neoconservatism is what the late historian of Jacksonian America, Marvin Meyers, called a "persuasion," one that manifests itself over time, but erratically, and one whose meaning we clearly glimpse only in retrospect.
Viewed in this way, one can say that the historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against
their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy. That this new conservative politics is distinctly American is beyond doubt. There is nothing like neoconservatism in Europe, and most European conservatives are highly skeptical of its legitimacy. The fact that conservatism in the United States is so much healthier than in Europe, so much more politically effective, surely has something to do with the existence of neoconservatism. But Europeans, who think it absurd to look to the United States for lessons in political innovation, resolutely refuse to consider this possibility.
Neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the "American grain." It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic. Its 20th-century heroes tend to be TR, FDR, and Ronald Reagan. Such Republican and conservative worthies as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Dwight Eisenhower, and Barry Goldwater are politely overlooked. Of course, those worthies are in no way overlooked by a large, probably the largest, segment of the Republican party, with the result that most Republican politicians know nothing and could not care less about neoconservatism. Nevertheless, they cannot be blind to the fact that neoconservative policies, reaching out beyond the traditional political and financial base, have helped make the very idea of political conservatism more acceptable to a majority of American voters. Nor has it passed official notice that it is the neoconservative public policies, not the traditional Republican ones, that result in popular Republican presidencies.
One of these policies, most visible and controversial, is cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady economic growth. This policy was not invented by neocons, and it was not the particularities of tax cuts that interested them, but rather the steady focus on economic growth. Neocons are familiar with intellectual history and aware that it is only in the last two centuries that democracy has become a respectable option among political thinkers. In earlier times, democracy meant an inherently turbulent political regime, with the "have-nots" and the "haves" engaged in a perpetual and utterly destructive class struggle. It was only the prospect of economic growth in which everyone prospered, if not equally or simultaneously, that gave modern democracies their legitimacy and durability.
The cost of this emphasis on economic growth has been an attitude toward public finance that is far less risk averse than is the case among more traditional conservatives. Neocons would prefer not to have large budget deficits, but it is in the nature of democracy--because it seems to be in the nature of human nature--that political demagogy will frequently result in economic recklessness, so that one sometimes must shoulder budgetary deficits as the cost (temporary, one hopes) of pursuing economic growth. It is a basic assumption of neoconservatism that, as a consequence of the spread of affluence among all classes, a property-owning and tax-paying population will, in time, become less vulnerable to egalitarian illusions and demagogic appeals and more sensible about the fundamentals of economic reckoning.
This leads to the
issue of the role of the state. Neocons do not like the concentration of services in the welfare state and are happy to study alternative ways of delivering these services. But they are impatient with the Hayekian notion that we are on "the road to serfdom." Neocons do not feel that kind of alarm or anxiety about the growth of the state in the past century, seeing it as natural, indeed inevitable. Because they tend to be more interested in history than economics or sociology, they know that the 19th-century idea, so neatly propounded by Herbert Spencer in his "The Man Versus the State," was a historical eccentricity. People have always preferred strong government to weak government, although they certainly have no liking for anything that smacks of overly intrusive government. Neocons feel at home in today's America to a degree that more traditional conservatives do not. Though they find much to be critical about, they tend to seek intellectual guidance in the democratic wisdom of Tocqueville, rather than in the Tory nostalgia of, say, Russell Kirk.
But it is only to a degree that neocons are comfortable in modern America. The steady decline in our democratic culture, sinking to new levels of vulgarity, does unite neocons with traditional conservatives--though not with those libertarian conservatives who are conservative in economics but unmindful of the culture. The upshot is a quite unexpected alliance between neocons, who include a fair proportion of secular intellectuals, and religious traditionalists. They are united on issues concerning the quality of education, the relations of church and state, the regulation of pornography, and the like, all of which they regard as proper candidates for the government's attention. And since the Republican party now has a substantial base among the religious, this gives neocons a certain influence and even power. Because religious conservatism is so feeble in Europe, the neoconservative potential there is correspondingly weak.
AND THEN, of course, there is foreign policy, the area of American politics where neoconservatism has recently been the focus of media attention. This is surprising since there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience. (The favorite neoconservative text on foreign affairs, thanks to professors Leo Strauss of Chicago and Donald Kagan of Yale, is Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War.) These attitudes can be summarized in the following "theses" (as a Marxist would say): First, patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment. Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny. International institutions that point to an ultimate world government should be regarded with the deepest suspicion. Third, statesmen should, above all, have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies. This is not as easy as it sounds, as the history of the Cold War revealed. The number of intelligent men who could not count the Soviet Union as an enemy, even though this was its own self-definition, was absolutely astonishing.
Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal. That is why it was in our national interest to come to the defense of France and Britain in World War II. That is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.
Behind all this is a fact: the incredible military superiority of the United States vis-à-vis the nations of the rest of the world, in any imaginable combination. This superiority was planned by no one, and even today there are many Americans who are in denial. To a large extent, it all happened as a result of our bad luck. During the 50 years after World War II, while Europe was at peace and the Soviet Union largely relied on surrogates to do its fighting, the United States was involved in a whole series of wars: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War. The result was that our military spending expanded more or less in line with our economic growth, while Europe's democracies cut back their military spending in favor of social welfare programs. The Soviet Union spent profusely but wastefully, so that its military collapsed along with its economy.
Suddenly, after two decades during which "imperial decline" and "imperial overstretch" were the academic and journalistic watchwords, the United States emerged as uniquely powerful. The "magic" of compound interest over half a century had its effect on our military budget, as did the cumulative scientific and technological research of our armed forces. With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.
The older, traditional elements in the Republican party have difficulty coming to terms with this new reality in foreign affairs, just as they cannot reconcile economic conservatism with social and cultural conservatism. But by one of those accidents historians ponder, our current president and his administration turn out to be quite at home in this new political environment, although it is clear they did not anticipate this role any more than their party as a whole did. As a result, neoconservatism began enjoying a second life, at a time when its obituaries were still being published.
Irving Kristol is author of "Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea." <!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
With all of the posting about "OMG NEO-CONS ARE KILLING ALL11!!!11!11," I thought it helpful to help clarify the basic tenets of neo-con thought.
Keep in mind, I don't agree with them 100 % (I lean quite a bit more Libertarian than Republican), but I'm posting this here so people quit using Neo-Con as some buzzword for "war monger" or "danger to international peace."
Comments
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
His philosophy would seem to be that we will be involved in a multititude of wars whether we are desirous of them or not; therefore, we should choose them ourselves.
Well if you can't bother to read the whole thing why even post?
That was very interesting an informative, and I thank illuminex for posting it.
I'm not so sure if I agree on the economic policies, we'll just have to wait and see how those work out, but I do however agree mostly with their foreign policy ideals. It also made a good point about our military superiority.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
His philosophy would seem to be that we will be involved in a multititude of wars whether we are desirous of them or not; therefore, we should choose them ourselves. <!--QuoteEnd--> </td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'> <!--QuoteEEnd-->
I still dont see what's wrong with that? The Monroe doctrine is dead. America recognised 100 years ago that it couldnt just let the world pass them by. If anything, neoconservatism is the first belief structure I've seen that seems to hold any duty of care towards any nation around them.
The fact that you are going to have to fight is inevitable for any nation. That's why I consider neoconservatism the perfect mix between optimism (we CAN change the world) and realism (it aint gonna be easy, and someone is gonna get hurt). The only other alternative is digusting US narcissm and insularity, typified by Bill "as long as no Americans die we dont care" Clinton.
His philosophy is <b>eventually</b> you are going to have to fight, or do you think that threatening ideologies and savage dictatorships only had a strict lifespan of 52 years from 1939 - 1991 and thats the end of them?
QUOTE
With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you.
His philosophy would seem to be that we will be involved in a multititude of wars whether we are desirous of them or not; therefore, we should choose them ourselves. <!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
So, in essence, America should not allow those desirous of war to choose America's destiny, and instead America should protect itself before it gets bombed again?
Interesting how that works.
Of course, people don't like the NeoCon philosophy because it means that the USA involves itself in other countries business more often, such as France and Germany, who had a pretty sweet deal set up with Iraq before the USA came in and ruined all those programs giving nice kickbacks.
Bad USA, you nasty warmongering nation, taking away our economic dealings with a brutal dictator that allowed terrorist camps and harbored a top Al Qaeda man. Bad bad bad USA. We're all going to give you a big, international spanking, and have our mindless drones in your own country participate!
DEATH TO BUSH, UP WITH FRANCE! AND KICKBACKS!
<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
This is a pretty gross misrepresentation of "Clintonian" foreign policy, especially when America took the lead in Kosovo, Somalia, and Iraq during the period. Why not place the blame on European nations? Or even Commonwealth nations. Canada and Australia seem to typify narcissm despite their status as world leaders.
As far as Europe, I'd be willing to give them the benefit of the doubt. The industrial base of the entire EU would be roughly equivalent to that of the USA; no one would expect a single european country to take the lead and bear the burden. They seem to be struggling with how to assert themselves collectively as a unified power and distribute costs, at the moment.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->His philosophy is <b>eventually</b> you are going to have to fight, or do you think that threatening ideologies and savage dictatorships only had a strict lifespan of 52 years from 1939 - 1991 and thats the end of them?<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
I have a theory that anyone with enough hubris to claim the title of President of the United States is generally spoiling for a war from the get-go. Out of patriotism, ideology, or a desire to get in the history books, I don't care. It's always the people that resist such impulses. The problem is that ever since FDR the president has had such power that the people really don't have much ability to resist.
Look at the wars we have gotten in since WWII. A bunch of cases of toppling banana dictators in central america, only to leave the country mired in poverty, and a bunch of cases of failing to achieve our goals in the first place.
Besides that, I think that in an effective democracy, a resistant insular population fighting the urges of a hawkish executive means that the only cases where war will break out will be the cases where it was absolutely necessary. I have a feeling that war is only a really effective policy decision when it is necessary.
Neocon philosophy is to fight wars not when they are necessary, but (theoretically to preempt that necessity) to fight wars when they are <i>convienient</i>. The Iraq war is an excellent case. The Bush Administration railroaded the UN and the WMD watchdogs not because they feared an imminent threat, but because they knew that the best time to launch a war in Iraq was before summer, when temperatures got up to 120 F and equipment and soldiers would break down much more quickly. If they hadn't gotten their war in April, they would have had to wait another 6 months, and by that time, the resistance which they had quashed with an effective media blitz would have recovered its feet.
Apart from Iraq and apart from any specific Neocon policies, just listen to the language that Kristol (the widely admitted "godfather" of the ideology who, if I can remember correctly, mentored both Wolfowitz and Rumsfield) uses.
First off, he is absolutely ready to provide a label for his ideas. Labelling your ideas is something you do when you expect to defend them in the halls of a university, not something you do when you are a pragmatic leader of a world power.
Secondly, look at the emotions associated with the ideology. "Hopeful ... forward-looking ... cheerful" are things you would expect from an undergraduate, not an efficient beaurocrat that pounds out compromise in the halls of democracy (more like "cynical ... judgemental ... concerned").
These smack of ivory-towerism, and while that is a circumstantial attack on its validity, it may still be a symptom of a problem with the neocon worldview.
Since when did gross misrepresentation and accurate representation mean the same thing?
NATO took the lead in Kosovo. And although American and NATO basically mean the same thing, once again an obsession with American casualties meant large scale collateral damage:
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->And despite the rhetoric about the war's "humanitarian" aim, NATO kept most of its warplanes above 15,000 feet to minimize allied casualties, which not only reduced their effectiveness in halting Serb aggression against the Kosovar Albanians, but also increased the collateral damage, including the accidental deaths of innocent Albanians and Serbs<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->Another mistake was to suggest that the high-altitude bombing campaign, prescribed by the American obsession with achieving "zero casualties," could stop ethnic cleansing on the ground. One of the goals President Clinton proclaimed in his television address at the beginning of the war was "to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo." The bombing campaign did something very close to the opposite. In fact, there were two parallel but largely separate campaigns: the tactical one, aimed at preventing Serbian forces in Kosovo from doing further harm to the Albanians, and the strategic one, aimed at Serbia proper. NATO won the second, but lost the first.
A combination of weather, peasant cunning, and low-tech diversions confounded NATO´s multibillion dollar high-tech weapons, as they tried to find and destroy Serbian armor in Kosovo. It turns out that laser-guided bombs are very difficult to use through clouds. Kosovo in spring is cloudy. Sophisticated cruise missiles home in on the radar of air defense systems. So the Serbs turned on the radar for a few seconds, then turned it off—and those poor, disoriented missiles wandered off into Bulgaria. One landed in a bathroom in Sofia. The Serbs built decoy bridges out of plastic; NATO knocked them down. The Serbs set up woodburning stoves, with their chimneys angled to look like gun barrels; NATO took them out with exquisite accuracy. The Serbs put painted logs on the backs of trucks; NATO obliged again.17 One trembles to think how many lives in sub-Saharan Africa could have been saved by the millions of dollars wasted in these farcical ways.
At the end of the war, NATO claimed that it had destroyed some 120 Serbian tanks, 220 armored personnel carriers, and 450 artillery and mortar pieces. But the Serbian armored columns that withdrew from Kosovo looked in remarkably good shape. According to the suppressed US Air Force report obtained by Newsweek, NATO verifiably destroyed just fourteen tanks, eighteen armored personnel carriers, and twenty artillery pieces. Even if the real figures are higher than that, it is an indisputable fact that ethnic cleansing increased under the bombing. As Judah observes, the main weapon of ethnic cleansing is the cigarette lighter (to set fire to houses). How many cigarette lighters can you hit from 15,000 feet? <!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Classic Clinton. And Somalia, geez, where do I start. How about here:
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->Clinton's Black Hawk History
We wish Bill Clinton a quiet retirement, if only he'd return the favor. But when the former President distorts history for the sake of political advantage, someone has to clean up afterward.
Responding to Bush Administration suggestions that some of today's corporate scandals first got out of hand under his watch, Mr. Clinton recently shot back: "These people ran on responsibility, but as soon as you scratch them they go straight to blame. Now, you know, I didn't blame his [President Bush's] father for Somalia when we had that awful day memorialized in 'Black Hawk Down.' I didn't do that."
We can understand Mr. Clinton wanting to defend himself, but as usual he can't get his own facts straight. His introduction of Somalia here is one of those breathtakingly brazen attempts to dodge responsibility for which Mr. Clinton is justly famous. Here's the real history:
President Bush the Elder sent U.S. forces into Somalia in December 1992 to aid the United Nations in relieving a massive famine. In May of 1993, four months into his term, President Clinton declared that mission accomplished and pulled out most of the U.S. forces. In a speech on the South Lawn to associate himself with the effort, he extolled the decision to intervene: "If all of you who served had not gone, it is absolutely certain that tens of thousands would have died by now." It was a "successful mission," he said, and "proved yet again that American leadership can help to mobilize international action ..."
But back in Somalia, with no U.S. deterrent, Somalia's warlords began fighting again. After a series of bloody attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, Mr. Clinton launched a new mission: In August 1993, he sent in a force of Rangers and Special Forces units to capture the brutal warlord Mohammad Farrah Aidid and restore order.
That force asked for heavy armor -- in the form of Abrams tanks and Bradley armored vehicles -- as well as the AC-130 gunship, but the Clinton Administration denied those requests. On October 3 on a mission to pick up Aidid, two Black Hawks were unexpectedly shot down; in the ensuing urban gun battle, 18 American soldiers were killed and another 73 injured.
Many military experts believe that if the U.S. forces had had armor, fewer would have died. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin resigned two months after Somalia, having acknowledged that his decision on the armor had been an error. A 1994 Senate Armed Services Committee investigation reached the same conclusion. But perhaps the most poignant statement came from retired Lieutenant Colonel Larry Joyce, father of Sergeant Casey Joyce, a Ranger killed in Mogadishu: "Had there been armor ... I contend that my son would probably be alive today ..."
Mr. Clinton's responsibility in Somalia doesn't stop there. Despite the mistakes that October day, Aidid had been struck a blow. The U.S. military, with 18 dead, wanted nothing more than to finish what it had started. Mr. Clinton instead aborted the mission. The U.S. released the criminals it had captured that same day at such great cost, and the U.N., lacking U.S. support, was powerless to keep order. Somalia remains a lawless, impoverished nation. Worse, the terrorists of al Qaeda interpreted the U.S. retreat from Somalia as a sign of American weakness that may have convinced them we could be induced to retreat from the Middle East if they took their attacks to the U.S. homeland.
Those are the facts. The reason Mr. Clinton can't blame the events of "Black Hawk Down" on President Bush's father is because those events had nothing to do with him. They were Mr. Clinton's responsibility, and his alone.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
OMG. American casualties, run away run away!!11111 And please explain to me how he took a lead in Iraq, I was of the understanding that was all Bush seniors doing, and although I'm angry he didnt finish the job, at least he saved the Kuwait kids.
And you dare to accuse Australia of narcissm? Good lord. Does our recent intervention in East Timor mean nothing to you? Our contributions to Afghanistan and Iraq, our restoration of order to the Solomon Islands, our donation of money to Indonesia to fight terrorism? In response to our prevention of slaughter in n East Timor seeking independence from Indonesia, we suffered our greatest terrorist attack ever, where 88 Australians were blown up in a Bali nightclub in direct response to our humanitarian efforts. Australia is anything but narcissitic.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->Look at the wars we have gotten in since WWII. A bunch of cases of toppling banana dictators in central america, only to leave the country mired in poverty, and a bunch of cases of failing to achieve our goals in the first place.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
I believe this is what happens when the US fiddles with other nations via the CIA, coups etc. When they actually get involved themselves ie troops on the ground, they have a much better chance (assuming they stick with it) of actually doing something useful.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->These smack of ivory-towerism, and while that is a circumstantial attack on its validity, it may still be a symptom of a problem with the neocon worldview.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
As you said, circumstantial, not going either way to prove anything conclusive.
We wish Bill Clinton a quiet retirement, if only he'd return the favor. But when the former President distorts history for the sake of political advantage, someone has to clean up afterward.
Responding to Bush Administration suggestions that some of today's corporate scandals first got out of hand under his watch, Mr. Clinton recently shot back: "These people ran on responsibility, but as soon as you scratch them they go straight to blame. Now, you know, I didn't blame his [President Bush's] father for Somalia when we had that awful day memorialized in 'Black Hawk Down.' I didn't do that."
We can understand Mr. Clinton wanting to defend himself, but as usual he can't get his own facts straight. His introduction of Somalia here is one of those breathtakingly brazen attempts to dodge responsibility for which Mr. Clinton is justly famous. Here's the real history:
President Bush the Elder sent U.S. forces into Somalia in December 1992 to aid the United Nations in relieving a massive famine. In May of 1993, four months into his term, President Clinton declared that mission accomplished and pulled out most of the U.S. forces. In a speech on the South Lawn to associate himself with the effort, he extolled the decision to intervene: "If all of you who served had not gone, it is absolutely certain that tens of thousands would have died by now." It was a "successful mission," he said, and "proved yet again that American leadership can help to mobilize international action ..."
But back in Somalia, with no U.S. deterrent, Somalia's warlords began fighting again. After a series of bloody attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, Mr. Clinton launched a new mission: In August 1993, he sent in a force of Rangers and Special Forces units to capture the brutal warlord Mohammad Farrah Aidid and restore order.
That force asked for heavy armor -- in the form of Abrams tanks and Bradley armored vehicles -- as well as the AC-130 gunship, but the Clinton Administration denied those requests. On October 3 on a mission to pick up Aidid, two Black Hawks were unexpectedly shot down; in the ensuing urban gun battle, 18 American soldiers were killed and another 73 injured.
Many military experts believe that if the U.S. forces had had armor, fewer would have died. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin resigned two months after Somalia, having acknowledged that his decision on the armor had been an error. A 1994 Senate Armed Services Committee investigation reached the same conclusion. But perhaps the most poignant statement came from retired Lieutenant Colonel Larry Joyce, father of Sergeant Casey Joyce, a Ranger killed in Mogadishu: "Had there been armor ... I contend that my son would probably be alive today ..."
Mr. Clinton's responsibility in Somalia doesn't stop there. Despite the mistakes that October day, Aidid had been struck a blow. The U.S. military, with 18 dead, wanted nothing more than to finish what it had started. Mr. Clinton instead aborted the mission. The U.S. released the criminals it had captured that same day at such great cost, and the U.N., lacking U.S. support, was powerless to keep order. Somalia remains a lawless, impoverished nation. Worse, the terrorists of al Qaeda interpreted the U.S. retreat from Somalia as a sign of American weakness that may have convinced them we could be induced to retreat from the Middle East if they took their attacks to the U.S. homeland.
Those are the facts. The reason Mr. Clinton can't blame the events of "Black Hawk Down" on President Bush's father is because those events had nothing to do with him. They were Mr. Clinton's responsibility, and his alone.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd--> <!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
I'll answer your quote with my own:
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->To be sure, there are legitimate questions about the scope and long-term purpose of the U.S. and UN presence in Somalia. When President George Bush sent American troops to Somalia in 1992 he defined the mission in strictly humanitarian terms. The U.S. was there to see that the starving were fed, not to impose a political solution on warring Somali factions. Bush rejected the UN's request to disarm the various clans and for an extended American military commitment to help build democracy in Somalia.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
and
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->In the aftermath of the killing of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers by General Aidid's men last June, the UN mission turned from peacekeeping into a manhunt. Apparently without much deliberation, the U.S. followed the UN's lead. But Aidid's position as a clan leader in the midst of what remains a barely dormant civil war made the UN's decision to label him a criminal dubious. In taking sides in this way, no matter how justifiably, the UN entangled itself in a situation it had neither the military might nor the political will to resolve.
Clinton has candidly admitted this mistake. As the subsequent softening of the U.S.'s attitude toward Aidid indicates - we are now ready to talk with him - only a political compromise that includes the clan leader will bring an end to the turmoil in Mogadishu. Turning away from any further military entanglement in Somalia is what Clinton seems to be aiming at in simultaneously sending more troops to Somalia as a defensive measure and announcing a March 31 pull-out<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Even your quotes should be sufficient evidence to deny an "insular" American foreign policy under Clinton. And by Iraq I was referring to the bombings initiated after Saddam rejected weapons inspections.
Not that I would defend Clinton's, nor any American president's, foreign policy much beyond that. From my point of view every executive regardless of party has followed either an extremely reactionary or dangerously militaristic foreign policy with the exception of a couple.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin--><!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->These smack of ivory-towerism, and while that is a circumstantial attack on its validity, it may still be a symptom of a problem with the neocon worldview.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
As you said, circumstantial, not going either way to prove anything conclusive.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Even though this is the only on topic part of your argument, I can really only say circumstantial does not equal irrelevant.
[edit]: typos
Secondly, look at the emotions associated with the ideology. "Hopeful ... forward-looking ... cheerful" are things you would expect from an undergraduate, not an efficient beaurocrat that pounds out compromise in the halls of democracy (more like "cynical ... judgemental ... concerned").
These smack of ivory-towerism, and while that is a circumstantial attack on its validity, it may still be a symptom of a problem with the neocon worldview.
<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Kristol is a political thinker, not a politician himself. He therefore has every right to "label" his ideas.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Optimism is a great thing, and I'd rather have someone with this kind of worldview over <!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->not an efficient beaurocrat that pounds out compromise in the halls of democracy (more like "cynical ... judgemental ... concerned").<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
"efficient beauracrat" = paradox. haha.
America was founded on the very ideal of being a "Shining City on the Hill." I'm glad to see that the Neo-Cons feel the same way.
Even though I disagree with some of their social views.
<!--QuoteEnd--> </td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'> <!--QuoteEEnd-->
I was thinking more along the lines of an oxymoron. <!--emo&:p--><img src='http://www.unknownworlds.com/forums/html//emoticons/tounge.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='tounge.gif' /><!--endemo-->
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->America was founded on the very ideal of being a "Shining City on the Hill." I'm glad to see that the Neo-Cons feel the same way.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Unfortunately America is obsessed with criticizing itself and focusing allot of its anger and hatred inwards. Sometimes this can be a good thing, but I think that pendulum has swung to far to the wrong side.
Interesting how that works.
Of course, people don't like the NeoCon philosophy because it means that the USA involves itself in other countries business more often, such as France and Germany, who had a pretty sweet deal set up with Iraq before the USA came in and ruined all those programs giving nice kickbacks.
Bad USA, you nasty warmongering nation, taking away our economic dealings with a brutal dictator that allowed terrorist camps and harbored a top Al Qaeda man. Bad bad bad USA. We're all going to give you a big, international spanking, and have our mindless drones in your own country participate!
DEATH TO BUSH, UP WITH FRANCE! AND KICKBACKS! <!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Funny but that's not what he meant. <!--emo&:p--><img src='http://www.unknownworlds.com/forums/html//emoticons/tounge.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='tounge.gif' /><!--endemo-->
The US should absolutely protect itself but by going out and occupying otehr nations is not a good way to be friends with them. Like it or not we are all stuck here on the same damn planet and our economies are connected.
PS: Just because "neo-conservatism" has young people doesn't make it "neo" (new). Catagorically I think while you may specifiy this as a type of conservatism it's not a phenomina and completely new line of opinion. (yes I read the whole quote)
~edit~
In the realm of conflict or most things international:
France sucks.
UK pwns.
US pwns.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->To be sure, there are legitimate questions about the scope and long-term purpose of the U.S. and UN presence in Somalia. When President George Bush sent American troops to Somalia in 1992 he defined the mission in strictly humanitarian terms. The U.S. was there to see that the starving were fed, not to impose a political solution on warring Somali factions. Bush rejected the UN's request to disarm the various clans and for an extended American military commitment to help build democracy in Somalia.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
and
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->In the aftermath of the killing of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers by General Aidid's men last June, the UN mission turned from peacekeeping into a manhunt. Apparently without much deliberation, the U.S. followed the UN's lead. But Aidid's position as a clan leader in the midst of what remains a barely dormant civil war made the UN's decision to label him a criminal dubious. In taking sides in this way, no matter how justifiably, the UN entangled itself in a situation it had neither the military might nor the political will to resolve.
Clinton has candidly admitted this mistake. As the subsequent softening of the U.S.'s attitude toward Aidid indicates - we are now ready to talk with him - only a political compromise that includes the clan leader will bring an end to the turmoil in Mogadishu. Turning away from any further military entanglement in Somalia is what Clinton seems to be aiming at in simultaneously sending more troops to Somalia as a defensive measure and announcing a March 31 pull-out<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Even your quotes should be sufficient evidence to deny an "insular" American foreign policy under Clinton. And by Iraq I was referring to the bombings initiated after Saddam rejected weapons inspections.
Not that I would defend Clinton's, nor any American president's, foreign policy much beyond that. From my point of view every executive regardless of party has followed either an extremely reactionary or dangerously militaristic foreign policy with the exception of a couple.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Fair enough, insular wasnt the right term to use. Ineffective and apathetic would probably be closer to the mark. Either way, its to hell with them, and American casuality minimisation as top priority, at the expense of civilians and actual usefulness. Your quotes also make it sound like the US pulled out (intelligently) and now it is all roses in Somalia, when it isnt. From what I understand the war raged for several more years, and is probably still going on. But hey, gg America, no one likes to fight a bloody civil war on an empty stomach, nor would we like the general population to be repressed while they got the munchies.
<!--QuoteBegin--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td><b>QUOTE</b> </td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'><!--QuoteEBegin-->Even though this is the only on topic part of your argument, I can really only say circumstantial does not equal irrelevant.<!--QuoteEnd--></td></tr></table><div class='postcolor'><!--QuoteEEnd-->
In this case, I think it does. If you dont like any political theory that is the slightest bit optimistic, then nihilistic anarchy is the only go for you.
Try reading before assuming. That's the whole point of this thread. Fascism and Neo-Conservatism have nothing in common. I wish I had a humongous "roll eyes" smiley to post here.